



Disinformation types in correlation with society's media literacy in Latvia

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FLPP
FUNDAMENTAL AND
APPLIED RESEARCH
PROJECTS

Disinformation

The European Commission defines **disinformation** as **'verifiably false or misleading information'** that is created, presented and disseminated for **economic gain or to intentionally deceive the public**, and may cause public harm.

Disinformation does not include reporting errors, satire and parody, or clearly identified partisan news and commentary.

(COM(2018)236)

The aim of disinformation is to distract and divide to plant seeds of doubt by distorting and falsifying facts, thus confusing people and weakening their faith in institutions and established political processes.

BEYOND 'FAKE NEWS'

10 TYPES OF MISLEADING NEWS

<p>propaganda</p> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> adopted by governments, corporations and non-profits to manage attitudes, values and knowledge appeals to emotions can be beneficial or harmful  	<p>partisan</p> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ideological and includes interpretation of facts but may claim to be impartial privileges facts that conform to the narrative whilst forgoing others emotional and passionate language  	<p>IMPACT</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">  neutral  low  medium  high <p>MOTIVATION</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">  money  politics/power  humour/fun  passion  (mis)inform
<p>clickbait</p> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> eye catching, sensational headlines designed to distract often misleading and content may not reflect headline drives ad revenue  	<p>conspiracy theory</p> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> tries to explain simply complex realities as response to fear or uncertainty not falsifiable and evidence that refutes the conspiracy is regarded as further proof of the conspiracy  rejects experts and authority  	
<p>sponsored content</p> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> advertising made to look like editorial potential conflict of interest for genuine news organisations consumers might not identify content as advertising if it is not clearly labeled  	<p>pseudoscience</p> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> purveyors of greenwashing, miracle cures, anti-vaccination and climate change denial misrepresents real scientific studies with exaggerated or false claims  often contradicts experts  	
<p>satire and hoax</p> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> social commentary or humour varies widely in quality and intended meaning may not be apparent can embarrass people who confuse the content as true  	<p>misinformation</p> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> includes a mix of factual, false or partly-false content intention can be to inform but author may not be aware the content is false false attributions, doctored content and misleading headlines  	
<p>error</p> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> established news organisations sometimes make mistakes mistakes can hurt the brand, offend or result in litigation reputable orgs publish apologies  	<p>bogus</p> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> entirely fabricated content spread intentionally to disinform guerrilla marketing tactics; bots, comments and counterfeit branding motivated by ad revenue, political influence or both  	

DIG DEEPER...

<p>false attribution</p>	<p>authentic images, video or quotes are attributed to the wrong events or person</p>	<p>misleading</p>	<p>content does not represent what the headline and captions suggest</p>
<p>counterfeit</p>	<p>websites and Twitter accounts that pose as a well-known brand or person</p>	<p>doctored content</p>	<p>content, such as statistics, graphs, photos and video have been modified or doctored</p>

eavi
 MEDIA LITERACY
 for CITIZENSHIP
www.eavi.eu

N.B. The impact and motivation assignments are not definitive and should just be used as a guide for discussion



Disinformation

Long-term aims

Short-term aims

Potential risks regarding media literacy I

Media usage habits - most frequently used sources of information

«In the states surveyed, the use of Russia's global media outlets RT and Sputnik is limited. The general trend is that the majority of communities in the Baltic States are aware of these Russian media outlets, but do not use them (more than 60%)»

«Use of RT and Perviy kanal [..] is linked to the use of the Russian language, thus making these Russian media outlets an integral part of the so called ‘Russian World’.»

«The results of the survey also give evidence that Russia is not a trusted source of information in the Baltic States, Finland, and Sweden, except among a part of Russian speaking audiences in the Baltic States.»

RUSSIA'S FOOTPRINT IN THE NORDIC -
BALTIC INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT
Report 2016/2017

Consumption of TV programmes produced in Russia

Perviy kanal (Первый Балтийский канал), NTV Mir Baltic, RTR Rossiya are watched almost by two thirds (63%) of the surveyed inhabitants of Latvia

More than one half (52%) of surveyed Latvians regularly or sometimes watch television programmes produced in Russia

These results, with the reference on the choice of language in media consumption (32% of the residents of Latvia prefer media in Russian), allow the assumption that a significant part of other ethnic group representatives in Latvia “reside” in Russian informational space.

The only socially-demographic group, where the audience of Russian TV channel viewers is less than 50%, are the young respondents below 34 years of age.

Research on Latvians’ media literacy (2017). Summary in English:

<https://www.km.gov.lv/en/media-policy/research>

The choice of Russian television is made for entertainment purposes:

Films and film series

Humour shows

Concerts and musical shows

Sports programmes

Popular science shows


News programmes produced by Russian television are watched by 28% of the residents of Latvia

Lūdzu, nosauciet līdz TRĪS biežāk izmantotajiem medijiem (preses izdevumus, TV un radio raidījumus, interneta portālus utt.) sekojošam mērķim:

JAUNUMU, ZIŅU IEGUVEI

Biežāk minētās atbildes

(Bāze = visi aptaujas dalībnieki; N=1082)



Q: please, mention up to 3 the most used media for **obtaining news**


Research on Latvians' media literacy (2017) . Summary in English: <https://www.km.gov.lv/en/media-policy/research>

Lūdzu, nosauciet līdz TRĪS biežāk izmantotajiem medijiem (preses izdevumus, TV un radio raidījumus, interneta portālus utt.) sekojošam mērķim:

PAR POLITIKU LATVIJĀ

Biežāk minētās atbildes

(Bāze = visi aptaujas dalībnieki; N=1082)



Q: please, mention up to 3 the most used media for obtaining information on **politics in Latvia**


Research on Latvians' media literacy (2017) . Summary in English: <https://www.km.gov.lv/en/media-policy/research>

Lūdzu, nosauciet līdz TRĪS biežāk izmantotajiem medijiem (preses izdevumus, TV un radio raidījumus, interneta portālus utt.) sekojošam mērķim:

PAR POLITIKU KAIMIŅVALSTĪS UN PASAULĒ

Biežāk minētās atbildes

(Bāze = visi aptaujas dalībnieki; N=1082)



Q: please, mention up to 3 the most used media for obtaining information **on politics in the neighbouring countries and worldwide**


Research on Latvians' media literacy (2017) . Summary in English: <https://www.km.gov.lv/en/media-policy/research>

Lūdzu, nosauciet līdz TRĪS biežāk izmantotajiem medijiem (preses izdevumus, TV un radio raidījumus, interneta portālus utt.) sekojošam mērķim:

IZKLAIDEI

Biežāk minētās atbildes


(Bāze = visi aptaujas dalībnieki; N=1082)



Q: please, mention up to 3 the most used media for **entertainment**

Research on Latvians' media literacy (2017). Summary in English: <https://www.km.gov.lv/en/media-policy/research>

The most popular sources used for entertainment purposes are www.facebook.com and www.youtube.com.



RUSSIA'S FOOTPRINT
IN THE NORDIC -
BALTIC INFORMATION
ENVIRONMENT Report
2016/2017



Aims of Russia's information activities in the NB8 region

Political dimension

Military dimension

Economic dimension

Informational dimension

The main tools for advancing Russia's aims are identified as:

Russia's domestic and international media system

the Internet and social media

government-organized non-governmental organizations (GONGOs)

Russia's compatriot policy

economic interdependency

the encouragement of political radicalization and polarization of Western societies

intelligence operations

demonstrations of military force etc.

Russia attempts to make impact on Latvia's informative space

„[...] Стратегическое направление этого сотрудничества - сохранение единого культурного и информационного пространства СНГ, сохранение и укрепление информационного присутствия России на пространстве СНГ и стран Балтии [...]”

Основные направления государственной политики по развитию сферы культуры и массовых коммуникаций в Российской Федерации до 2015 года и план действий по их реализации (2006)

*„82. Укреплению национальной безопасности в области культуры способствуют: [...] развитие **общей гуманитарной и информационно-телекоммуникационной среды** [...] в сопредельных регионах[...]"*

SPUTNIK



Jau rudenī Latvijā tiks aizliegti krievu vārdi

LATVIJĀ 10:15 31.05.2016 (atjaunots 08:33 31.05.2016) [Saņemt Iso saiti](#)

1458

Tieslietu ministrija ir sagatavojusi likumprojektu, kas faktiski pilnībā liedz bērniem piešķirt nelatviskus vārdus un uzvārdus. Pēc Tieslietu ministrijas domām, tas ļaus pasargāt latviešu valodu un demokrātiju.

RĪGA, 31. maijs – Sputnik, Jevgēņijs Leškovskis. Līdz 1. septembrim Ministru kabinets izskatīs likumprojektu, kas aizlieds vecākiem saukt bērnus nelatviskos vārdos.

Izrādās, Tieslietu ministrija jau sen ir norūpējusies par to, ka pašlaik Vārda, uzvārda un tautības ieraksta maiņas likums ļauj visiem, kas vien to vēlas, izvēlēties nelatvisku vārdu un uzvārdu, turklāt faktiski nav nekādu normu, kas noteiktu, kādu vārdu vecākiem būtu jādod saviem bērniem. Šīs normas ir iekļautas jaunajā likumprojektā.

ZIŅAS

LASĪTĀKAIS

JAUNĀKAIS

Patriotisma monetizācija: Latvijā parādīsies kvass "Mežabrāļu" 109


Valdis Pelšs iekļuvis portāla "Myrotvorets" datu bāzē 46

Neesi samaksājis nodokļus? Gatavo 100 tūkstošus 28

Jauni sodi: līdz 7 tūkstošiem eiro par sarkano zvaigzni vai svastiku 25

Asānžs pastāstīja, kādēļ Tramps varētu tikt atstādināts no varas 24

Potential risks regarding media literacy II - uncritical evaluation and sharing of information




**% of youngsters
(15-24 years) believing in
information found on social
media**



Research on Latvians' media literacy (2017) . Summary in English:

<https://www.km.gov.lv/en/media-policy/research>



**% of youngsters
(15-24 years) sharing
information on social media
without checking it**



Research on Latvians' media literacy (2017) . Summary in English:

<https://www.km.gov.lv/en/media-policy/research>



Photo: Eric Pickersgill
<http://www.designboom.com/art/eric-pickersgill-removed-smartphones-10-14-2015/>

Potential risks of media literacy III

Only 40% of respondents say they can identify reliable information from a biased and fabricated

Higher self confidence of being able to discern credible information from misleading information is held among people **with high or medium high level of income per one family member, survey participants with higher education.**

One in four (27%) participants of the study replied that they cannot evaluate their capacity of discerning reliable information in media from manipulative information, because they have not thought about that.

Potential risks of media literacy IV

Half of Latvian inhabitants believe that the media is a mirror of the world

if some information is published/broadcasted in media, it should be considered to be true

Research on Latvians' media literacy (2017) . Summary in English:
<https://www.km.gov.lv/en/media-policy/research>

Potential risks regarding media literacy V

Certain share of the residents of Latvia cannot assess the results offered by the Internet search engines (for instance, Google, Bing, or others).

26% of the respondents agree to the statement that the first results offered by Internet search engines are the most reliable, and 15% of the respondents could not provide answers to this question.



Activities of deconstruction of lies and promotion of media literacy implemented **by media themselves** are of particular importance

the study shows that from those respondents who want to know more about media literacy, **85%** expect the information from the media

Research on Latvians' media literacy (2017) . Summary in English:
<https://www.km.gov.lv/en/media-policy/research>

MELU TEORIE

Melu tvertne: Biedē ar Krievijas un Nīderlandes karu

Melu tvertne: Hormoni un antibiotikas vistas gaļā

Melu tvertne: Asinspirts Balvu



STOP
Šādi izskatās viltus ziņa!
Uzmanies, nedalies!

ku un brīvdienu komisija (SSBK) pēc interneta portāla tavabalss.lv
usi, ka šā gada Ziemassvētku brīvdienas varētu tikt pārceltas uz

2018. gadā, Ziemassvētki iekrit attiecīgi pirmdienā, otrdienā un trešdienā.
strijas aplēsēm, trīs svētku dienas radīs vairākus miljonus zaudējumu
cības nozarēm. "Trīs svētku dienas nodarīs neadekvātu postu
SK piedāvājam svētku dienas pārnest uz 2019. gadu, kas būtu
skaidro Ekonomikas ministrijas nārstāvis Ilāis Kalniņš

ATMASKOTS!

Русские имена в Латвии запретят уже осенью

lesaki šo rakstu citiem!

5 Facebook Draugiem Twitter E-pasts

Viens no klasiskajiem ziņu tematiem, kas attiecībā uz Latviju dažādos veidos un interpretācijās
gadiem kļūst Krievijas un krievvalodīgo mediju ziņu lapās, saistās ar krievu personvārdu oficiālo
lietošanu un rakstību Latvijā.

IZSARGAJIES GUDRI -

Lai viltus ziņas nevaļojas

Projekts "Viltus ziņas izsmācas? Izsargājies" ir sagatavots ar Valsts
reģionālās aģentūras finansiālu atbalstu no Latvijas valsts budžeta līdzekļiem.

VILTUS ZIŅAS? IZSARGĀJIES!

Stājoties attiecībā ar viltus ziņām, neaizmirsti par kontracepciju!
Radio SWH Rock aicina: izsargājies gudri – lai viltus ziņas nevaļojas. Katru dienu
ēterā pasniegsim trīs viltus ziņas un to atbilstošās dekonstrukcijai, lai attīstītu
sabiedrības kritisko domašanu un medijpratību.

Ziņu arhīvs:

- "VILTUS ZIŅA 1" — BOBS-HÄRTLIS 1:37
- "VILTUS ZIŅA 2" — BOBS-HÄRTLIS 1:58
- "VILTUS ZIŅA 3" — BOBS-HÄRTLIS 1:54
- "VILTUS ZIŅA 4" — BOBS-HÄRTLIS 1:55
- "VILTUS ZIŅA 5" — BOBS-HÄRTLIS 1:30
- "VILTUS ZIŅA 6" — BOBS-HÄRTLIS 1:39
- "VILTUS ZIŅA 7" — BOBS-HÄRTLIS 1:36
- "VILTUS ZIŅA 8" — BOBS-HÄRTLIS 1:53
- "VILTUS ZIŅA 9" — BOBS-HÄRTLIS 2:07
- "VILTUS ZIŅA 10" — BOBS-HÄRTLIS 1:49

MELU TEORIJA

SKATIES.LV
CSSD: OCTA vairs nebūs obligāta
No 2019. gada obligātā civiltiesiskā transportlīdzekļu apdrošināšana jeb...
43,728 People reached
16,382 Engagements

Need more real lies debunking materials (not only specially created fake news articles)




It is hard to measure the impact of disinformation

Without relevant longitudinal studies it is difficult to demonstrate a direct correlation between the measures taken and changes in perception, opinions and attitudes.


How do you rate the ethnic relations in Latvia?

(Ethnic minorities; source: The participation of minorities in democratic processes in Latvia, LU FSI, 2017)



How true do you think is a claim that Fascism prevails in Latvia?

(Respondents whose family language is Russian; source: The Latvian Ministry of Defense, 2016)



Future



- Deepfake
- Next elections
- How to reach people living in Kremlin information space?
- Next media literacy research results in Autumn 2019 (project «Latvian Media Ecology» and in 2020 by Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Latvia)

Thank you!

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